Abstract-The altruistic user behavior and the isolation of malicious users are fundamental requirements for the proper operation of any cooperative network. However, the widespread use of new communication techniques that improve the cooperative performance (e.g., network coding) hinders the application of traditional schemes on malicious users detection, which are mainly based on packet overhearing. In this paper, we introduce a cooperative nonparametric statistical framework, namely COPS, for the mitigation of user misbehavior in network coding scenarios. Given that the behavior of adversaries cannot be characterized by certain probability distributions, the proposed scheme exploits two well-known nonparametric statistical methods, i.e., Kruskal-Wallis analysis and Conover-Iman multiple comparisons, for the detection and identification, respectively, of malicious users in the network. It is worth noting that the COPS framework does not require monitoring of the wireless channel and additional overhead, as its operation is based on the processing of the existing control packets. We assess the performance of the proposed scheme in various scenarios, showing that COPS is able to effectively handle attacks in the network, even when malicious users adopt a smart probabilistic misbehavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE introduction of 4G wireless communications has triggered the appearance of new technologies, such as cyberphysical systems and device-to-device communications, that allow the direct communication among devices and imply network densification. Moving toward 5G, the network densification is expected to be even higher with billions of devices (either sensors or smart terminals) deployed and used worldwide [1] . As a result of this network evolution and paradigm shift in communications, cooperative communication is now an intrinsic network The authors are with the Telecommunications Technological Centre of Catalonia (CTTC/CERCA), 08860 Castelldefels, Spain (e-mail: aantonopoulos@cttc.es; cveri@cttc.es).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TII.2017.2754579 mechanism and not merely an alternative way of transmission, while techniques that exploit and enhance the advantages of cooperation are moving strongly to the forefront. One of the techniques that have been widely developed during the last decade is network coding [2] , [3] , which enables the intermediate nodes in a cooperative network to mix different packets, thus offering reliable communication and improved network performance.
Regardless of the particular adopted technology and techniques, the basis for every functional cooperative network lies in the altruistic user behavior and the packet forwarding by the intermediary nodes [4] - [7] . However, this collaboration implies for the relays valuable energy and capacity resources that could be instead exploited for the transmissions of their own data. This problem is further aggravated in wireless networks, where the radio and energy resources are usually scarce, thus increasing the probability of a noncooperative selfish attitude. In addition, the broadcast nature of the wireless medium makes wireless networks more vulnerable in security attacks by malicious adversaries.
A. Motivation and Related Work
In the aforementioned context, the protection of the network against selfish and malicious users has become of vital importance, and the proposed solutions can be classified in two basic categories [8] : proactive and reactive security mechanisms. The works that fall in the former category [9] - [12] aim at constructing a network of trust, either by building reputation tables or providing the nodes with incentives to cooperate. On the other hand, the reactive mechanisms [13] - [20] operate in real time, as the nodes overhear the neighbor transmissions to monitor the network activity or employ special acknowledgments (control packets) for the end-to-end communication.
The characteristics of the reactive mechanisms (i.e., simplicity, scalability, and applicability) constitute them ideal candidates for security provision in current networks, which are highly unsettled and volatile. As a result, the scientific research community was urged toward the design of new security solutions that guarantee the proper network operation by enabling the online tracing of malicious users. In their pioneer work [13] , Marti et al. proposed a basic detection technique, namely watchdog, that identifies the misbehaving nodes by enabling the wireless nodes to operate in the promiscuous mode and monitor their neighbors in order to determine whether the latter have forwarded the data to the final destination. Another interesting reactive approach has been proposed by Liu et al. [14] , where the authors introduce an acknowledgment-based scheme (2ACK) to mitigate the impact of misbehaving nodes. The operation of 2ACK is based on special control packets that are employed to acknowledge the correct two-hop communication. In [15] , a distributed sequential misbehavior detection technique based on the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) is developed, where the nodes overhear all control packets to make statistical decisions. However, these works, as well as subsequent similar efforts that were based on the same ideas [16] - [20] , suffer evident disadvantages, such as increased power consumption and additional packet overhead.
The introduction of network coding is an additional deterrent for the application of the above mentioned techniques in current large-scale cooperative networks [21] , as the network-coded packets are no longer tractable by conventional or artificialintelligence-based schemes [22] . Moreover, the simple packet acknowledgments have been replaced by cumulative reports [23] that contain information about the senders of the received data at a given node. To overcome these limitations, Kim et al. [24] introduced algebraic watchdog, a network-coding-oriented monitoring scheme that allows the detection of routing misbehavior in a probabilistic manner by overhearing the neighboring transmissions and exploiting the algebraic properties of network coding. Despite its novel insights in network-coding scenarios, algebraic watchdog faces common problems of monitoring techniques, as its operation is exclusively based on the promiscuous packet overhearing, while it requires nodes of advanced functionality, which are capable of processing complex computational algebraic functions.
B. Contribution
In this paper, motivated by the impact of malicious users in cooperative communications, we introduce a novel reactive statistical technique for mitigating misbehavior issues in packet forwarding in mobile networks. Given that the behavior of adversary users cannot be characterized by certain probability distributions, the proposed method exploits well-known nonparametric statistical approaches to detect and identify the malicious users in the network. Unlike most of the existing approaches (i.e., [13] - [20] ), our solution is compatible with network-coding scenarios, while it does not imply any additional computational or power overhead for the nodes (unlike [24] ), since its operation relies on the analysis of the existing control packets. Our contribution can be summarized in the following points.
1) We introduce an integrated cooperative nonparametric statistical framework, namely COPS, for the mitigation of user misbehavior in network-coding scenarios. The proposed method analyzes the existing control packets in the network without requiring any additional overhead, any a priori knowledge for the type of the malicious users, nor any monitoring of the wireless channel. More specifically, COPS consists of two interactive modules: a) a detection method, based on the Kruskal-Wallis statistical test [25] , which examines whether all the control packets belong to a single population (i.e., honest users) and b) a post-hoc identification technique, based on the Conover-Iman multiple comparison [26] , which is triggered by the detection of abnormal activity in the network and identifies the malicious users in the network. 2) We assess the performance of the proposed scheme in various scenarios and use cases, showing that COPS is able to effectively confront network attacks, even when malicious users adopt a smart probabilistic misbehavior. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The problem statement is introduced in Section II. The system model and the impact of malicious activity are presented in Section III. The proposed COPS framework along with the detailed description of its two basic modules is introduced in Section IV. The performance evaluation is provided in Section V, while Section VII concludes this paper.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we intend to clarify the problem under study and shed some light on the employed concepts. The origin of the problem lies in the lack of explicit acknowledgments in networkcoding scenarios, since, in such scenarios, the nodes receive linear combinations of the original packets through different relays. Hence, the simple packet acknowledgments have been substituted by bulk acknowledgments that verify the reception of many packets, while they include the portion of information that the node has received by each relay.
For instance, let us consider the case where the destination node is located in the range of two relay nodes that transmit network-coded packets. The typical situation in this particular example (e.g., similar channel conditions and fair medium access control) is that, at the end of the communication, each relay should have transmitted approximately half (i.e., 50%) of the total packets. Hence, the destination can issue a bulk acknowledge that declares the portion of information that has received by each relay, and consequently, this control packet can be used as a report to characterize the relay's behavior. However, the employment of these new acknowledgments raises an important issue, as the reliability of these reports is questionable. In particular, two types of fake reporting have been identified [11] : 1) underreporting, the acknowledged portion of information is lower than the actually received, and 2) overreporting, where the acknowledged portion of information is higher than the actually received. Fig. 1 provides an example of a cooperative network with one source node (S) that disseminates information at four destination (D) nodes through five relay (R) nodes, while the destinations periodically issue reports to characterize the corresponding relay nodes. In such scenarios, different types of misbehavior can be observed, as also discussed above. More specifically, the relays can be either cooperative/good or selfish/bad (depending on whether they participate in the packet relaying or not), while the destination nodes can be honest or malicious. Honest nodes (depicted in green color) issue always truthful reports, while malicious nodes (depicted in orange color) may issue fake reports about the relay's behavior and can be categorized as types U and O, depending on whether they under-or overreport the received packets, respectively. For example, as D 2 (type U) receives packets by both R 1 and R 2 , it may underreport R 1 to damage the network. As a result, D 2 will still receive the total information by R 2 , but the false characterization of R 1 as selfish will significantly affect node D 1 . Regarding the malicious users of type O, we see that node D 3 might be indifferent for the selfish behavior of some relays, as it receives packets through multiple links. Consequently, by overreporting R 5 (either to cause network damage or because they cooperate), node D 4 will be excluded from the network.
The aforementioned example highlighted the different types of users that can be encountered in a wireless network and provided some indications about the potential malicious activities. Apparently, in real large-scale networks with a plethora of devices, the problems are further escalated. Therefore, given the shortcomings of the traditional misbehavior mitigation approaches and the existence of coded information, the proposal of new effective methods for the identification of malicious users in the network is now compulsory. To that end, the filtering of the transmitted reports seems an appealing solution, as the identification of the fake reports would assist toward the identification of the malicious and selfish nodes in the network.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND IMPACT OF MALICIOUS ACTIVITY
In this section, we describe the system model and we study the impact of malicious users on the application of security mechanisms in the network. The notation employed throughout this paper is summarized in Table I .
A. System Model
The architecture of a real network can be decomposed into similar parts that follow the same pattern. Hence, without loss of generality, we assume a network (see Fig. 2 ), where node A transmits network-coded information to a set of M nodes C = {C m : 0 < m ≤ M}. In periodic time intervals, the receivers issue a report c m (t) ∈ {0, 1} that characterizes the behavior of node A, i.e., c m (t) = 1 and c m (t) = 0 denote that A is cooperative or selfish, respectively. Therefore, taking into account that the time between two consecutive reports is T r , the report generation constitutes a discrete random process, denoted by {c m (t) : t = t 0 + nT r , n ∈ Z}, where t 0 is the generation moment of the first report. Regarding the behavior of node A, we introduce the binary variable B(t) ∈ {0, 1}, which is either 1 or 0 in the case that node A is cooperative or selfish, respectively. Assuming the existence of only honest users, under ideal channel conditions, it should hold that c m (t) = B(t), ∀t. However, false reports could also be generated due to unpredictable factors (e.g., channel conditions) or due to the existence of malicious users. In our work, potential channel errors are considered through a probability of false reports ( p e ), while the probability of deliberate fake reports ( p f ) is also taken into account.
We assume that all generated reports at time t are collected by a central entity/controller that is able to monitor the network (e.g., network administrator). According to the majority of these reports, which is a common case of the "k-out-of-n" decision rule [27] , the central entity makes a decision d C E (t) about node A. This can be mathematically expressed as
(1)
B. Impact of Malicious Activity
As there is no indication for the behavior B(t) of a given node, the decision d C E (t) is based exclusively on the received reports. Therefore, the reception and analysis of fake reports could alter the correct decision, causing serious malfunctions in the network. In order to capture the potential discrepancies between the individual reports and the central decision, let us define as
, 1} the binary variable that compares a particular report with the final decision. Apparently, δ m (t) = 0 when the report is identical with the decision, while δ m (t) = 1 when the report is different from the decision. However, the characterization of the nodes cannot be based only on the instantaneous reports, mainly due to the dynamic nature of the wireless medium, as it is possible that some transmissions are not received owing to channel errors (in this case, the destination may falsely characterize the corresponding relay as noncooperative). As a result, to increase the robustness of the decision, it is essential to study the discrepancies of the reports over time. To that end, instead of employing a specific δ m (t) value, we focus on the expected value of δ m in L consecutive feedback periods, defined as
In order to study and identify the different behaviors in the network, we need to focus on the properties of
and
The graphical illustration of f D m is essential for the comprehensive demonstration of the user discrepancies. To that end, Fig. 3 provides an example of f D m in the case of a malicious user of type U [see Fig. 3(a) ] and type O [see Fig. 3(b) ], respectively. In this specific example, we assume that the relay node is not cooperative (i.e., B(t) = 0) and does not forward the incoming packets. In addition, we assume a total number of 1000 reports, while the number of consecutive feedback periods for our study is L = 5. The probability that a malicious user transmits a fake report is p f = 0.7 and the probability of wrong reports due to channel errors or other imponderable factors is p e = 0. The plots presented in Fig. 3 highlight the important differences that may be observed in the reports of different users and, therefore, indicate that the comparison of the f D m would be an effective way for malicious user detection. More specifically, the central entity has access to M D m random variables, generated by one or more types of users, where each type is characterized by a different behavior and probability of communicating fake reports. In the ideal case, where the random variables would be normally distributed, the application of parametric statistical methods (e.g., analysis of variance) would efficiently identify the different types of users in the network. However, in our problem, the normality assumption is too strict (as it can be seen in Fig. 3 ), something that complicates the malicious user detection in the network by employing classical parametric statistical methods and stresses the need for nonparametric approaches.
IV. COOPERATIVE NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICAL DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF MALICIOUS USERS
In this section, we introduce a nonparametric statistical scheme, namely COPS, for the mitigation of malicious activity in network-coding-enabled wireless networks. The proposed scheme, which is based on the transmitted control packets, is executed in two phases, as it is also depicted in Fig. 4. 1) In the detection phase (Phase I), the central entity collects the reports for a given node and performs a statistical analysis based on the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric method. 2) In the identification phase (Phase II), which is executed only when malicious users have been detected during the first phase, the central entity conducts multiple comparisons to the sample reports based on the Conover-Iman post-hoc method. 1 In the following sections, we analytically present the two algorithms and the statistical analysis that takes place in each module.
A. Kruskal-Wallis Detection
As we have seen in Section III-B, in our case, the trend and the behavior of the users cannot be modeled according to wellknown statistical distributions. For this reason, we are motivated to adopt the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric statistical method to detect the existence of malicious users in the network. The Kruskal-Wallis test is based on the ranking of the samples and is able to detect whether different sets of samples belong to the same population, i.e., they have been generated by the same probability distribution.
The analysis of the median is the main characteristic of the nonparametric statistical methods, as there is no normality assumption in the distribution of the samples. In particular, median is defined as the numeric value that separates the higher from the lower half of a sample set, a population, or a probability distribution, thus being more robust to vulnerabilities (e.g., outliers) compared to the mean value. This robustness is the key point that makes the analysis of the median and the application of nonparametric statistics appropriate for our proposed scenario. Defining as η m the median of D m , the null (H 0 ) and the alternative (H 1 ) hypothesis of the statistical Kruskal-Wallis test can be expressed as
In this context, the acceptance of the null hypothesis implies that the differences between the medians of the different samples are not significant, and hence, all M random variables belong to the same population. On the other hand, the rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the M random variables have been generated by different populations, something that verifies the existence of malicious users in the network.
The maintenance of a database with these samples is fundamental for the application of the proposed method. More specifically, at a given time instant t, the central controller makes a decision about node A according to the majority of the collected reports by the M nodes. Subsequently, this decision is compared with the individual reports to generate M δ m binary variables, and after L received reports by each node, one single sample for the variable D m is calculated. However, the application of statistical methods requires several samples, hereafter denoted by Q, while the nonparametric statistics are based on the ranks of the samples, rather than their actual values. Hence, given a set of samples
and is equal to the number of observations in the set S that are smaller than or equal to D m (t − qT D ). Accordingly, the test statistic can be written as [25] 
where N is the total number of samples (i.e., N = M Q) and R m is the total sum of the individual ranks for node m, equal to
Moreover, since, in practice, the behavior of H can be approximated by the chi-square distribution with M − 1 degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis is rejected if (8) where α corresponds to the significance level. An indicative table with the values of χ 2 α,M−1 for different degrees of freedom and significance levels is provided in [29, Table 1 ].
It is worth noting that sometimes the observations are tied (i.e., they have the same value). In our particular case, the Boolean nature of the reports leads to quantized average values, and consequently, strong ties among the samples. As a result, the test statistic should be replaced by
where σ 2 denotes the variance of the ranks, calculated as
In the case that the number of ties is moderate, the difference between the two tests becomes negligible. However, the complex type of the test is more complete and can be used in any 
B. Conover-Iman Identification
The rejection of the null hypothesis by the Kruskal-Wallis method indicates the existence of malicious users in the network, but it is not sufficient for their recognition. More specifically, a post-hoc or a posteriori analysis is required to identify the malicious users in the network. In our case, given that the normality assumption does not hold, the most appropriate method to distinguish the different populations is the Conover-Iman test, which is based on multiple comparisons between pairs of samples. In COPS, all users are sorted in an ascending order according to their sum rank [see (7)] and, for every two consecutive users, it is tested whether
where
and t N −M,1−α/2 is a quantile from the Student's t-distribution on N − M degrees of freedom and a level of significance 1 − α/2. 
The two nodes belong to different populations else
Same Set
The two nodes belong to the same population end if end for
If (11) holds, the two users are considered to belong to different populations, and every time a new discrepancy is identified, a new set is created as the users are already ordered. The algorithmic process of the Conover-Iman identification is summarized in Algorithm 2.
C. Computational Complexity
The proposed algorithm includes two phases: 1) the KruskalWallis detection and 2) the Conover-Iman identification. Regarding the first phase, defining as n the total number of collected samples/reports, the executed functions and the corresponding complexities are as follows.
1) Scan the table to make the decision → O(n).

2) Compare the decision with each report → O(n).
3) Sort the table to rank each sample → O(n log n).
On the other hand, in the case of detection during the first phase of the algorithm, there are two distinct functions on the second phase.
1) Sort the table in ascending order → O(n log n).
2) Pairwise comparisons in the table → O(n).
Consequently, as the complexity is determined by the most important term, we may claim that the complexity of the proposed algorithm is O(n log n).
V. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
We have developed an event-driven C++ simulator that executes the rules of the proposed COPS framework for malicious user detection and identification in network-coding-based wireless networks. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations have been carried out to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism in different scenarios. In this section, we present the simulation setup along with the experimental results.
A. Simulation Scenario
We consider a scenario as illustrated in Fig. 2 , where node A transmits network-coded packets to a set of M nodes. In periodic time intervals, each receiver generates a report c m that characterizes the behavior of node A (i.e., either selfish or co- In the case that malicious users have been detected in the network, the second module of the scheme is triggered, and pairwise multiple comparisons, based on the Conover-Iman procedure, are conducted in the set of the collected samples to identify the different populations. Regarding the reports c m , we assume that honest users send false reports with a probability p e due to channel errors, while malicious users provide deliberately false reports with a probability p f . The simulation parameters are summarized in Table II .
B. Simulation Results
Fig . 5 presents the detection probability versus L and Q, which represent the interval between the generations of the D m and the total number of D m , respectively. In this particular scenario, we assume that there are four users in the range of node A (M = 4), where three of them are honest and one is malicious, providing fake reports for the behavior of A with a probability p f = 0.25. In addition, the significance level α = 0.05, which is a relatively tight value. The plot in Fig. 5 clearly demonstrates that the probability of malicious user detection depends on the product of L and Q, rather than on their individual values. In particular, when L Q > 200, the malicious user is always detected with probability equal to 1. Fig. 6 presents again the detection probability for a similar scenario. However, in this case, we assume that the malicious user is more aggressive, providing deliberately fake reports with a higher probability, i.e., p f = 0.4. As we can observe, the probability of detecting the malicious user in the network converges much faster to 1, indicating that a lower number of samples is required for the detection of a malicious user in the network.
The significance level α is a crucial parameter for the execution of the Kruskal-Wallis method, since it characterizes the sensitivity of the proposed algorithm to the differences among the samples. To that end, Fig. 7 presents the detection probability versus different significance levels in two scenarios with seven honest users (i.e., |U h | = 7), different number of malicious users in the network, and various cases of malicious user activity (i.e., Fig. 7 (a)] with two malicious users, we observe that low values of significance level imply low detection probability, especially when the malicious users are not particularly aggressive (i.e., low p f ). However, the malicious users can be detected with higher probability, as they become more aggressive (i.e., higher p f ). More specifically, the proposed algorithm is able to detect any malicious activity with probability equal to 1 when the malicious users adopt a p f = 0.3, which practically means that malicious activity is detected even if (nearly) only one out of three reports is fake. Regarding the case of five malicious users [see Fig. 7(b) ], we can see that the detection probability is much higher, even when the malicious users are not so aggressive (i.e., p f = 0.20). As a result, the number of malicious users in the network has a direct influence in their detection, a fact that can also be conceived intuitively.
In Fig. 8 , we study how the detection probability is affected by the number of malicious users. More specifically, we assume a network with three honest users (i.e., |U h | = 3) and different number (i.e., one to nine) of malicious users. In this plot, we assume that α = 0.05, while various cases for the misbehavior probability p f are considered. Again, the L and Q values have been selected equal to 10 and 15, respectively. Apparently, the number of malicious users does not significantly affect the detection probability when p f is relatively low (e.g., p f = 0.15), since, in this case, the probability of deliberately transmitting false reports is very close to the probability of transmitting false reports due to channel errors (i.e., p e = 0.10), thus hindering the distinction between malicious and honest users and honest users. On the other hand, as the probability of misbehavior grows, the detection probability significantly increases with the probability of misbehavior, rendering the detection even of only one malicious user possible, in the case of p f = 0.3.
Apparently, by adopting a high significance level (e.g., α = 0.2), the central entity would always be able to detect the malicious users in the network. However, high values of α cause an increased probability of false detection, i.e., high probability of characterizing honest users as malicious. To that end, we study a scenario with ten honest users (i.e., |U h | = 10) and no malicious user in the network. Fig. 9 presents the false detec- tion probability for different values of significance level and Q samples. As we can see, the detection probability increases up to p d = 0.18 for α = 0.2 and Q = 5. As Q increases, the probability of falsely detecting honest users as malicious decreases, but it does not annihilate for high significance levels. The most important conclusion from this figure is that the significance level and the number of samples are strongly related, as both affect the false detection probability. More specifically, the significance level should be selected according to the available 
number of samples. For small numbers of Q, the significance level should be quite low in order to guarantee zero false detection probability, while a big number of samples enables the selection of a more flexible significance level (e.g., for Q = 20, the false detection probability is almost zero, even if α = 0.05).
In Fig. 10 , we evaluate the Conover-Iman identification in scenarios where the Kruskal-Wallis method detects the malicious users in the network with probability equal to 1. More specifically, we assume eight honest users (i.e., |U h | = 8) in the network with p e = 0, and we study two different cases with one and four malicious users. As we may see, in the case that the malicious users adopt an relatively aggressive strategy with p f = 0.3, COPS is able to identify all of them with high confidence (i.e., α = 0.05). On the other hand, when the malicious users have a mild behavior with one out of five fake reports, their identification is much more complicated in low significance levels, especially as their number increases, since their discrepancies with the honest users become negligible. Nonetheless, in all cases, COPS is able to identify the malicious users using a high significance level (i.e., α = 0.2), although a higher misdetection risk would be implied. This tradeoff is determined by the desired security level of the network and its study would be of great interest.
Finally, in Fig. 11 , we compare the network energy efficiency in the case that COPS and Algebraic Watchdog, respectively, are applied in the network. More specifically, we assume the existence of monitoring nodes to study a scenario where both schemes are able to successfully detect the node misbehavior. In Algebraic Watchdog, the monitoring nodes overhear the transmissions of the source, while in COPS, the monitoring nodes could be in the idle mode or even in the sleep mode. The power levels for the various modes are in line with [30] . Apparently, as the number of monitoring nodes increases, the network energy efficiency of the Algebraic Watchdog decreases, as more nodes have to overhear the transmissions. On the other hand, the network energy efficiency is up to 56% higher in COPS when the monitoring nodes are in the idle mode and the improvement can reach 78% if the nodes switch to the sleep mode. It is also worth noting that, when the monitoring nodes are able to be in the sleep mode, the network energy efficiency remains almost constant, something very important for future applications, where the network lifetime will be of crucial importance.
In a nutshell, we have provided a thorough and extensive evaluation of the proposed COPS scheme in various scenarios, aiming at assessing the impact of different parameters (i.e., L, Q, U h , M U /M O , p f , p e , and α) on its performance. The most important conclusions can be summarized as follows.
1) The detection probability is highly dependent on the product L Q, which should be optimized in order to guarantee an efficient detection of malicious users, keeping the total time for their detection in low levels.
2) The number of malicious users (M U or M O ) in the network, the probability of misbehavior ( p f ), and the significance level (α) are very critical factors for the detection of malicious activity in the network, as detection probability increases when either of these factors increases.
3) The particular values of deliberate malicious activity ( p f ) and false transmissions due to channel conditions ( p e ) determine the detection probability, since malicious users are more easily tracked when these values are different. However, the proposed scheme has been shown to operate efficiently even when the aggressiveness of the malicious users is not high (i.e., p f = 0.3) and close enough with the false estimation due to channel errors (i.e., p e = 0.1). 4) The appropriate selection of α is of fundamental importance, as high values of α cause high false detection probability (i.e., honest users can be characterized as malicious), affecting the smooth network operation. 5) The proposed algorithm effectively detects and identifies the malicious users in the network regardless of their percentage in the network (e.g., even when M U exceeds U h ), as its operation is based on the detection of populations with different behavior in the network.
VI. CHALLENGES AND OPEN ISSUES
In this section, we present some challenges and open issues related to our proposed scheme. However, before this discussion, we would also like to provide a clear view on the benefits that COPS offer compared to the existing schemes. To that end, Table III summarizes an overview of the main characteristics of the state-of-the-art approaches. Apparently, COPS is the only scheme that offers network-coding support without any additional overhead. Nevertheless, there are still important challenges that pave the way for future research, as follows.
A. Protocol Optimization
Let us recall that the performance of COPS depends both on the number (L) of feedback periods for the calculation of D m and the total number (Q) of D m samples. The estimation of the optimal values of L and Q would be of crucial importance in realistic systems, where the timely detection of malicious users is required. Although a high number of L and Q increases the probability for accurate detection, it also increases the detection delay. Moreover, as these values highly depend on the particular scenario, their adaptability in real scenarios where the rest variables (e.g., misbehavior probability or channel conditions) could change would be another interesting research line.
B. Level of Centralization
The operation of the COPS framework is based on the existence of a central controller (e.g., base station) that is able to receive the ACK packets from the nodes and makes all the processing and the decisions. However, different levels of centralization could also be considered in order to bring our proposal closer to distributed solutions. The placement of the controller could also be subject to optimization, and the possible tradeoffs could also be studied.
C. Testbed Implementation
The implementation of COPS in an experimental testbed would be the first step toward its application in real scenarios. More specifically, under ideal channel conditions, it is expected that our solution would have identical performance as in the conducted simulations. However, as the performance of COPS is highly dependent on channel errors (since a node could be falsely characterized as noncooperative), its deployment in real networks under realistic channel conditions would reveal additional aspects for its performance.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we introduced COPS, a novel cooperative nonparametric statistical framework for the mitigation of user misbehavior in network-coding-aided scenarios. The proposed scheme can be easily applied in wireless networks, as its operation is based on the processing of the existing control packets and does not require any additional overhead nor channel monitoring. More specifically, COPS detects and identifies the malicious users by incorporating two well-known statistical methods: 1) the Kruskal-Wallis test, which examines whether all the control packets have been generated by a single population (i.e., honest users); and 2) the Conover-Iman multiple pairwise comparisons, which identify and separate the different groups of users (i.e., honest and malicious) in the network. Extensive simulation results have shown that COPS detects and identifies efficiently the malicious users in the network, even when they adopt a flexible probabilistic misbehavior (e.g., transmitting only one out of three fake reports).
